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Abstract This study investigates how three regulatory reforms undertaken in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis have affected returns of real estate companies.
The three reforms are aimed at regulating different segments of the market – Basel III
targets banks, and could restrict the availability of bank debt to the sector; the
Alternative Investment Fund Management Directive (AIFMD) targets funds, which
could increase compliance costs and reduce the potential investor pool; the European
Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) is aimed at derivative trading and could
impact the cost of debt capital. We employ an event study methodology using daily
stock returns of real estate companies and identify the regulatory events through news
published in major international financial newspapers and news agencies. Our results
show different responses across the three regulations. For Basel III we find support for
the regulatory burden hypothesis of the bank lending channel for small real estate firms
and firms with low debt-to-equity ratios as they cannot diversify their funding sources.
The direct regulatory effect as tested using AIFMD announcements supports the profit-
based reaction hypothesis for large firms. We also show that the news have asymmetric
effects with tighter regulation news more frequently leading to significant responses in
average abnormal returns (AARs) than loosening regulation news.
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Introduction
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC) regulators tried to strengthen the
resilience of the financial system and reduce systemic risks by improving the existing
financial market regulations and putting new regulations in place. Some of the main
regulatory reforms which have been introduced at the international level include Basel
III, the Alternative Investment Fund Management Directive (AIFMD) and the Euro-
pean Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). Whereas Basel III extends the regula-
tions for depository institutions imposed by Basel II, the AIFMD is a new regulation
that targets non-UCITS funds, which are regarded as alternative funds including private
equity, hedge funds and real estate funds in order to increase the transparency of that
market and better protect investors. The EMIR is another regulation whose aim is to
increase the transparency of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivative markets.
The above regulations potentially could have strong direct or indirect effects on real
estate companies. We could observe indirect effects stemming from Basel III given the
high credit intensity of direct real estate as an asset class. Real estate companies
purchase assets for investment purposes and in order to do so, they operate with high
leverage – tapping into the debt markets. Bank credit is still the predominant source of
financing for listed real estate companies investing in income-producing properties.
Hence, companies strongly relying on bank loans can be affected if banks are subject to
new regulations. This could happen through the bank lending channel (Gambacorta
2005; Milcheva 2013a). Banks may change the funding costs for real estate companies
in response to the financial regulation and this can have effects on the valuation of the
companies and hence their performance. Other types of regulation such as AIFMD
target directly real estate companies and funds. They can be associated with increases in
the cost of compliance or increases in operating costs therefore having a direct impact
on the cash flows of real estate companies. Finally, given that real estate is a lumpy
asset requiring long-term financing, real estate companies may decide to hedge interest
rate risk using derivative products. The instruction of EMIR could thus have strong
effects on real estate companies which are trading such securities and may have indirect
effects on the cost of hedging and hence their performance.
Overall, there is scarce research assessing the impacts of the recent financial market
reforms. The lack of empirical research in this area thus far is due to the dearth of data
and the uncertainty surrounding some of the regulatory reforms. Most of the research
that has assessed the relationship between regulation and asset prices has looked at the
role of bubbles on financial institutions. Schleifer and Vishny (2011) discuss the effect
of real estate bubble bursts on leveraged financial institutions and a subsequent
deleveraging and fire sales. Crowe et al. (2013) argue that real estate booms which
are financed through credit and involve leverage would lead to more pronounced
regulatory actions associated with macroprudential regulations. Allen and Carletti
(2013) develop a model of real estate pricing in two regimes accounting for borrowing
and agency problems and use it to analyze the effects of macroprudential policies.
Some of those regulatory measures include loan-to-value (LTV) restrictions and capital
requirements. Basett and Blake Marsh (2016) look specifically at the effects of financial
market regulations on banks with high exposure to commercial real estate loans. They
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show that such banks reduce the provision of commercial real estate lending and
substitute it with housing lending when faced with higher regulation. Such
macroprudential regulation can affect the bank behavior and hence real estate loan
provision. Cronin and McQuinn (2016) show for the Irish housing market that regu-
lations targeting LTV ratios for bank loans would lead to higher demand for rental
accommodation and higher rents.
Overall, we see that there is a relationship between asset prices and in particular
real estate prices and regulation – but most of it from a macroeconomic perspec-
tive. Although we still cannot assess the long-term welfare implications without
awaiting the full implementation of the regulations, this study provides a first
assessment of the contemporaneous effects of financial regulations on the listed
real estate sector. Our main focus is on analyzing the impact of regulation on the
value of equity as well as market risk of listed real estate companies in selected
European countries with well-developed listed real estate markets (France, Ger-
many and the U.K.). We assess whether announcements about regulatory reforms
post-GFC affect those companies and what are the channels of transmission of the
news. We assess the channels through which regulatory news affect the perfor-
mance of listed real estate companies distinguishing between type, size, leverage,
and location of the companies.
As our focus will be on news about financial regulation, we use an event study
methodology to assess the implications of stock returns. Event studies have
traditionally been used to evaluate the impacts of regulatory news and go back to
Schwert (1981). They have mainly been used to assess the effects of changes in the
market value of equity since it is most sensitive to information given the residual-
claim nature for investors of the asset class. More recently, this methodology has
been applied to assess the impacts of policy and regulatory actions associated with
the GFC. For example, Schäfer et al. (2015) look at the effects of press announce-
ments of major country-level banking regulations post-GFC on stock returns in
Germany, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S. They find that the largest implica-
tions for returns stem from the Dodd-Frank reform enacted in the U.S. and in
particular from the Volcker rule. Bongini et al. (2015) conduct a case study to
investigate the effects associated with the publication of a list of systemically
important financial institutions (SIFI) and new regulation for too-big-to-fail
(TBTF) banks. They find that only the returns of institutions which are poorly
capitalized respond significantly negatively to the announcements. Fratianni and
Marchionne (2013) use an event study to assess the effects of government inter-
vention announcements to inject capital in troubled banks and the banking industry
as a whole following the GFC. They find that the effects of announcements to help
individual banks have negative effects on the stocks of those banks.
Announcements about government support for the entire financial sector have
however no significant effects on bank valuations when controlling for time and
bank fixed effects. The authors conclude that such announcements were either not
credible or not appropriate to address the problems in the financial markets.
Veronesi and Zingales (2010) find that the effect of the Paulson Plan on the
valuation of banks had a positive effect decreasing the probability of bankruptcy,
providing benefits for bondholders of major investment banks. Georgiadis and
Graeb (2016) show that announcements about the asset purchase program by the
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European Central Bank (ECB) have significant effects on equity indices across
different countries, government bond yields and exchange rates.
The use of event studies requires the correct identification of the regulatory
events or event periods. An investigation of large-scale financial market regula-
tions such as Basel can present a challenge since the reform is subject to a
complex negotiation process over several years and has been phased out several
times already. Such large-scale regulations involve a lot of parties, such as
consultants, lawyers, politicians, governments, regulated institutions (i.e., banks
and fund managers), investors, who meet to discuss the reforms which can affect
the likelihood of one or another outcome. This means that financial market
participants continuously adjust their expectations with regards to the regulation
following unexpected announcements. Therefore, markets would react only if the
outcomes differ from their expectations. If, for example, there is news about
regulation becoming more lax, markets would respond positively, and vice versa.
However, the reforms can be a predictable process and could already have been
reflected in the prices of stocks prior to the official announcement. Therefore, we
want to identify the true impact of the regulatory event, not when the reform has
officially been introduced, but when, for the first time, news about the regulatory
reform has become available.
We follow the methodologies in O’Hara and Shaw (1990) and Schäfer et al.
(2015) to identify events by looking at major newspapers. In particular, we follow
a three-step approach. First, we search for news containing the name of the
regulatory reform in the Financial Times. We select as news associated with
Basel III those articles which have been published on the front page. The reason
is that Basel III is a major international financial market reform and information
representing real news should appear as a headline of a major international
financial newspaper. Regarding the identification of the AIFMD and EMIR, a
front page search is problematic, as these are more specific regulations which do
not necessary feature on front pages. For them, we consider articles across all
pages which contain the name of the regulation. Second, the ultimate choice of
the events is made by screening all identified articles and assessing if it is
considered news or not. Third, we double check if the dates identified feature
in other media such as other newspapers, regulatory bodies’ websites or news
agencies (i.e., Bloomberg).
Our results show large differences across the three regulations. Basel III and
EMIR have overall small aggregate effects on the performance as they do not
directly regulate real estate companies. However we find some support for the
regulatory burden hypothesis of the bank lending channel. We document that the
banking regulation negatively affects small firms and firms with low debt-to-
equity ratios. This may suggest that the strongest effect is observed for firms who
cannot diversify their funding sources and are thus hit strongest by Basel III. The
direct channel through the AIFMD supports rather the profit-based reaction
hypothesis. Mainly large firms are affected positively by the regulation which
can be due to identified regulatory arbitrage opportunities for real estate compa-
nies if they do not have to comply with AIFMD. Overall, we see that different
regulation can have opposite effects on companies and it is important to look at
them separately as well as assess the impacts of tighter regulation news and
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loosening regulation news separately. We find strong evidence for asymmetric
effects with negative news more frequently leading to significant responses.
Effects of Regulatory Reforms
Hypotheses
The effect of the regulations can lead to three possible outcomes – an overall positive
reaction to the news, an overall negative reaction, or no significant reaction. Similar to
Bongini et al. (2015), we identify three hypotheses which are graphically presented in
Fig. 1. The profit-based reaction hypothesis assumes a positive market reaction due to
the benefits of regulation associated with an increase in welfare and decrease of the
price of capital due to less systemic risk and uncertainty. Regulation can prevent
systemic events and contagion and lower the connectedness among financial institu-
tions thus making them more resilient to downturns. For Basel III, for example, if banks
are more tightly regulated, market participants can see this as an improvement in
financial stability and hence reduce the cost of systemic risk. This can have positive
effects on funding costs and may lead to banks offering cheaper financing in the end.
The opposite effect can be associated with the regulatory burden hypothesis. It
assumes that financial regulation is rather a regulatory burden because it can, for
instance, increase the cost of risk diversification, as well as operating and compliance
costs, or reduce the number of eligible investors. In the case of Basel III, regulatory
capital requirements can be such heavy covenants that all the wealth effects noted
above would quickly dissipate. An increase in compliance costs can be outsourced to
final borrowers and alter their funding costs as a result.
Finally, regulation may not have any noticeable impact. This is in line with the
irrelevance hypothesis which assumes that markets do not expect regulation to have an
Note: Return r is the return in the period just before the announcement, t=-1. In the 
current period, t=0, there is news about tighter financial market regulation. We have 
three hypotheses in the outcome of the returns in the next period, t=1. The return r 
can be higher, increasing by the value of the average abnormal return (AAR) in line 
with the profit-based reaction; it can fall by AAR in line with the regulatory burden 
hypothesis or it can remain unchanged, in line with the indifference hypothesis.
Fig. 1 Hypotheses for the responses to news about tighter financial market regulation. Note: Return r is the
return in the period just before the announcement, t = −1. In the current period, t = 0, there is news about
tighter financial market regulation. We have three hypotheses in the outcome of the returns in the next period,
t = 1. The return r can be higher, increasing by the value of the average abnormal return (AAR) in line with the
profit-based reaction; it can fall by AAR in line with the regulatory burden hypothesis or it can remain
unchanged, in line with the indifference hypothesis
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impact on the company of interest as the new regulation is not considered a dramatic
regulatory change. For the example of Basel III, markets may already believe that there
may be alternative and cheap sources of funding such as debt issuance or alternative
providers of loans, thus no wealth effect can be tied to the new regulation. This is
associated with the possibility of regulatory arbitrage, when financial institutions manage
to sustain their operations escaping tighter regulation. A tightening in the banking
regulation creates a window of opportunity for ‘shadow banks’ to take on market share
by providing loans. If regulation is perceived as too tight, traditional financial intermedi-
aries can shift funds off balance sheets towards the less regulated financial sector through
special purpose vehicles (SPVs) in a similar fashion as they did prior to the GFC.
Kroszner and Strahan (2011) argue that the Basel reforms Bencouraged firms outside
the regulatory umbrella to engage in activities traditionally done by those under the
umbrella^ leading to the emergence of balance sheets of unregulated banks. Kim and
Mangla (2012) explain the excessive flow of investment into the shadow sector prior to
the financial crisis with too tight banking regulation. An increased interconnection
between the shadow and the traditional financial sector has been observed in both the
euro area and the U.S. with a significant share of financing coming from the shadows
(Bakk-Simon et al. 2012). Therefore, despite the potential negative impact on funding
costs for bank lending, large companies could be able to access alternative sources of
debt capital (through the issuance of corporate bonds, or other non-bank lenders)
reducing the impact of Basel III. Milcheva (2013b) discusses the effects of regulatory
announcements on the housing and stock markets looking at the effect of regulatory
arbitrage. The author finds that regulatory arbitrage via the U.S. securitized sector may
enhance the cross-country reallocation of capital from housing markets towards equity
markets thereby leading to higher equity prices and lower house prices. In this paper,
regulatory arbitrage may be a way of reducing the regulatory burden for regulated
financial institutions and prohibit changes in the price of the funding costs.
Basel III and the Bank Lending Channel
The main objective of Basel III is to avoid future bank failure and systemic risk in the
wider economy by requiring depository financial institutions to hold more capital
against expected losses or to change their assessment of risk. The third instalment of
the Basel Accords was developed as a response to the problems associated with
banking regulation revealed by the GFC between 2010 and 2011 and is being phased
Fig. 2 Basel III and the bank lending channel
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in until March 2019. Pillar I of the regulation tightens the definition of what can be
included in the calculation of bank capital and tries to make the methodology of
calculating risk-weighted assets more sensitive to risks.
Albeit regulating banks, Basel III can have indirect effects on listed real estate
companies through the bank lending channel. The channel is presented in Fig. 2.
Basel III regulates banks with the aim to make them more resilient to downturns
and prevent global systemic effects. To do this, one can say that Basel III poses
tighter regulatory capital requirements for certain types of real estate loans.
Therefore, the bank lending channel can lead to higher or lower credit provision
by banks depending on which of the above effects of the regulation prevails. On
the one side, the loan provision to real estate companies can be negatively
affected, reducing the amount of bank credit available due to a change in the risk
assessment of real estate loans under Basel III as compared to Basel II. For
example, one change is the risk weighting for a new category of loans – high-
volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) loans – which receive a risk weighting
of 150% compared to 100% previously under Basel II. A loan is classified as an
HVCRE loan when it finances the acquisition, development, or construction of
real property1 mostly with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios above 80%. As a result of
the higher weighting, banks will end up with higher regulatory capital require-
ments of 12% instead of currently 8% when providing this type of loans and they
may decide to reduce the loan provision to developers and real estate companies.
Another change is related to the risk assessment of project loans which could
face a risk weight of up to 250%. Project loans are one of the main ways large
scale real estate projects and infrastructure projects are financed. Furthermore,
Basel III increases the risk weight of mortgage servicing rights (MSRs) which are
generated when banks originate mortgages. As a result, banks can decide to sell
off the MSRs to other non-bank companies to manage them instead of keeping
them on their balance sheets. This may increase the costs for them and these costs
can be outsourced to the mortgage borrowers. Given higher risk weights for
certain types of real estate loans, banks may decide to decrease the amount of
lending to real estate companies or may increase the borrowing costs. In this case,
we would expect a negative effect on the returns of real estate companies. The
reason is that markets perceive the regulation as negative either through an
increase in the cost of debt or through a decrease in the quantity of debt. This is
in line with the regulatory burden hypothesis.
On the other hand, market participants can perceive regulation as a necessary
evil, which in the long run will lead to less interconnectedness between financial
institutions and less systemic risk. This in turn may result in a more efficient and
stable financial system, and reduce the overall funding costs. If this is the case, we
would expect a positive effect on the returns, in line with the profit-based reaction
hypothesis. Therefore we would expect Basel III to affect more strongly real estate
companies which have high loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. In addition, companies
which rely more heavily on bank finance may be more strongly affected. We also
1 Exempt from the HVCRE classification are loans that finance the acquisition, development or construction
of one- to four-family residential properties, real property that would qualify as community development
investments, or loans to business or farms with gross revenues of $1 million or more.
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may observe that small and large firms are affected differently. Large companies
may be less negatively affected by the regulation as they will be able to offset
higher bank funding costs by tapping into alternative sources of funding such as
issuing debt, a secondary equity issuance, or junior sources of funding by other
financial institutions. We can observe some crowding out of small companies
which may lose competitiveness.
AIFMD and the Direct Fund Channel
While Basel III is a regulatory reform not directly affecting real estate companies, the
AIFMD would have a direct effect on real estate firms which are operated as alternative
funds – the direct fund channel. Talks about the AIFMD started in 2009 with the
directive being published on July 1, 2011. The directive had to be adopted into the
national laws by July 22, 2013. The AIFMD introduces for the first time a harmonized
European regulatory regime for managers of Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs). The
AIFMD defines an AIF as any collective investment scheme which raises capital from a
number of investors with a view to investing that capital in accordance with a defined
investment policy. Thus, the definition of an AIF is extremely wide and captures many
open-ended and closed-ended listed and unlisted real estate funds. It may also apply to
a subset of global real estate investment trusts (REITs) and property companies
depending on the decisions by national regulators as well as on the decision of the
company’s management. While AIFMD is a European-wide regulation – it is up to the
discretion of the national authorities how they will proceed with it. Therefore, we may
observe a different approach to classifying companies into AIFs across the countries.
The approach adopted in countries like the U.K., Germany and France is on a case-by-
case basis. Whether a listed real estate company qualifies as an AIF would depend on
the purpose and the investment strategy of the company.
The impact of the AIFMD on the European listed real estate companies is direct and
would affect their operations making them either more efficient or increasing the
compliance costs which may lead to more or less competition on the market for funds.
Thus, the effects can be either positive or negative. The profit-based reaction hypothesis
can be associated with the potential benefits associated with ‘passporting’, i.e., funds
that have obtained a ‘passport’ would be allowed to operate across Europe. However,
AIFMD could also be associated with regulatory burdens for real estate investment
vehicles and could therefore redefine existing boundaries in the real estate sector. On
the one hand, given the high compliance costs, the AIFMD may crowd out some non-
European Union (EU) REITs despite their interest in the EU market. As a result, this
may lead to a significantly smaller number of players in the European market if non-EU
managers together with some EU managers exit the EU market. Moreover, the uncer-
tainty for non-EU investors surrounding the new legislation may deter investment in
REITs which are classified as AIFs. In particular, this can be the case for Chinese
investors who face restrictions for holdings in foreign funds.
On the other hand, the AIFMDmay encourage the passive rather than the active model
with REITs adopting the structure of a fund rather than that of an actively managed real
estate business with implications for the financing of real estate development and infra-
structure projects. Moreover, whether a listed real estate company is qualified as an AIF or
not could also determine the underwriting status for insurance companies, pension funds
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and banks and lead to changes in the shareholders’ structure of REITs. In Belgium, for
example, the majority of REITs had to seek shareholder approval to adopt a new corporate
status that legally separates them from funds, thereby avoiding the additional regulatory
constraints and higher costs that AIFMD would have imposed. The regulatory ignorance
hypothesis suggests that investors may not perceive the AIFMD regulation as relevant.
That can be the case if certain property companies are not be classified as AIFs hence they
are unaffected by the regulation. One would therefore expect the AIFMD regulation to
have different effects across European countries and across companies depending on how
it is implemented in each country and across types of companies. In addition, we could
find differences between small and large real estate companies. Large companies may be
less negatively affected by the regulation as they will be able to offset higher compliance
costs more easily due to economies of scale. We can observe some crowding out of small
companies which may lose competitiveness.
EMIR and the Hedge Channel
If a REIT falls under the AIFMD regulation, it will be classified as a financial entity
becoming subject to the EMIR. EMIR regulates any entity classified as a ‘financial
counterparty’ which includes any real estate vehicle which is an AIF under the
AIFMD and subjects the real estate vehicle to mandatory clearing of derivative
transactions. This can have negative implications for the company as it may be
required to hold extra cash collateral with a central counterparty whenever it uses
swap arrangements. The effect of the EMIR regulation can be particularly pronounced
for real estate companies and funds as they would hedge the mortgage rates of long-
term real estate loans against floating interest rates. As a result, small companies may
decide not to hedge against those risks and this can make them riskier or lead to an
increase in the funding costs (see Fig. 3). The effect on the real estate companies is
thus indirect through the ‘hedge’ channel. If companies rely on hedging activities,
then they can be affected as they would need to comply with EMIR. Larger
companies instead may not experience any significant effect as they will more easily
find the resources to provide additional collateral.
Fig. 3 EMIR and the hedge channel
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Methodology and Data
Selection of Events
In order to measure the regulatory impacts, we look at announcements associated with
regulatory changes. Thereby, we want to account for the fact that the majority of the
regulatory events do not involve a single well-defined announcement and are not
associated with a single date. Large regulations such as Basel III rather involve a series
of smaller announcements which can gradually affect listed real estate companies.2
There are several ways to collect information on announcements associated with
regulatory changes. One way is to look at reports by regulatory bodies and their
representatives, such as the European Commission (EC), the European Securities and
Markets Authority (ESMA), and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS). However, using such sources of information only can leave us with incorrect
identification of events if market participants have already priced the news prior to the
official announcement of the regulatory body. Therefore, we want to identify the true
regulatory event, not when the reform has officially been introduced, but when, for the
first time, news with regards to the regulation has become available. We use a common
way of identifying events by using the editor process of news agencies such as the Wall
Street Journal and Financial Times. This approach has been used in previous studies
such as O’Hara and Shaw (1990) and Schäfer et al. (2015).
The selection of the event dates in this paper consists in several steps for the purpose
of ensuring the right identification of events. In the first step, we search for events in the
paper edition of the Financial Times (FT) UK and FT Europe using ProQuest. The
search is conducted using the full name of the regulation as a keyword to sort out
potential articles. For Basel III, we select all articles containing the word ‘Basel III’
which feature on the front page. A similar selection process has been applied by
Schäfer et al. (2015). The reason is that Basel III is the major international financial
market reform in recent years and information representing real news should appear as
a headline of a major international financial newspaper. Regarding the identification of
the AIFMD and EMIR, a front page search is problematic, as these are more specific
regulations which do not necessary feature on front pages because they affect specific
industries only and are conducted on a smaller scale. For them, we conduct a keyword
search of articles across all pages.
After narrowing down the potential pool of events, we read each article and
make a decision if it is real news or just a commentary not announcing anything
new. In this process we look for keywords which may indicate some new infor-
mation associated with amendments to the regulations. For example, there can be
an interview for a regulator who announces that the regulation will be tighter than
expected. If an article reports a past event, such as a meeting of the Basel
committee, we look up when the meeting was and whether there were any previous
news associated with it. In a next step, we double check if the news has been
announced on that date and in this newspaper first or features somewhere else
earlier. The way we account for it is by searching in the Bloomberg news database
2 Binder (1985) analyzes major changes in regulatory constraints in the U.S. and finds that most regulatory
changes are already anticipated in the stock returns.
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1 month prior to the identified FT article for similar news. As Bloomberg cover a
wide range of sources including newspapers, we can be confident that it accounts
for major news.
Moreover, during the Bloomberg search, we account for the exact time at
which the news was first published online as it can be the case that the paper
edition has a delay and the news first features online. This is important as some
articles can be published after stock markets have closed, so market participants
cannot account for the news on that day. If this is the case, we choose the
following day as the event date. The final step is to control for other news/
events which have taken place on the same day as the regulation news. For this
purpose, we screen the front page of the paper edition of the FT Europe for each
of the dates we have identified through the above procedure. We are looking for
events which can also have strong effects on listed real estate companies and
major economic news (e.g., the Greek crisis or the ECB policy). The final event
dates are presented in Table 1. Along with the event date, we include the title of
the article, a short description of the event, the source of the news, the
publication date of the news as well as the expected effect on returns following
the news – tighter regulation news or loosening regulation news.
Given the international nature of the reforms and the large number of parties
involved in the consultations, information is less likely to remain confidential.
For this purpose, we choose an event window of 3 days instead of just 1 day
allowing for market anticipation and delayed reaction. Schäfer et al. (2015) also
choose an event window of 3 days – 1 day before the announcement, the day of
the announcement when the article is published and 1 day after the
announcement.
Market Data
We use daily stock prices of real estate companies sourced from Thomson Datastream.
The focus on European countries is explained by the fact that the regulatory reforms we
study affect predominately European-domiciled companies. The countries in our sam-
ple include France, Germany and the U.K. as they have the largest listed real estate
markets. Figure 4 shows daily equally-weighted returns of the 15 largest real estate
companies from UK, Germany and France from January 1, 2009 to April 1, 2015.3 We
can see that in some days during the GFC and again in May–July 2010 and the second
half of 2011 returns show considerably higher or lower values as compared to returns
during the rest of the sample period. Those are also the periods in which most of the
regulatory announcements have happened.
With regards to the market returns, we use a global market index in the
baseline estimations in order to exclude the possibility of spillover effects across
stock markets in different countries. Such an approach has been adopted in
Ongena et al. (2003) and Schäfer et al. (2015). We use the Stoxx Global Total
Market Net Return Index.
We conduct the study for several sets of companies. The subsamples of
companies and their summary statistics are presented in Table 2. Using 92
3 This forms our baseline sample. See Table 5 for the companies in this sample.
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Table 1 Identified events associated with financial market regulation
Article title Publication
date
Event date Loosening
regulation
news
Source
1A. Events associated with Basel III
Summit 02/04/2009 02/04/2009 no Bloomberg
Banks win battle for limits to Basel III; Basel III
proposals eased by regulators
25/06/2010 25/06/2010 yes FT
Basel deal reached on banks’ reserves; Bankers fear
race to toughen regimes
13/09/2010 13/09/2010 no FT
Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically
important financial institutions, Wall St dividend
constraints are eased
20/10/2010 20/10/2010 yes FSB
Shadow banks to face global scrutiny, says Turner 17/11/2010 12/11/2010 no FT
Guidance for national authorities operating the
countercyclical capital buffer, Strengthening the
resilience of the banking sector
16/12/2010 16/12/2010 no FT, BCBS
Basel III break for banks in EU 27/05/2011 27/05/2011 yes FT
Global Systemically Important Banks: Assessment
Methodology and the Additional Loss
Absorbency Requirement—Rules Text
19/07/2011 19/07/2011 no BIS
Basel chief pushes tough line on bank reforms 10/10/2011 10/10/2011 no FT
Update on Basel III implementation 18/10/2011 18/10/2011 no BIS
Bank regulators reject industry pleas for delay to
liquidity buffers
09/01/2012 09/01/2012 no FT
Progress report on Basel III implementation and
procedures for conducting country reviews
published by Basel Committee
03/04/2012 03/04/2012 yes BIS
European Union seeks strict newcurbs to cap
bankers’ bonuses; EU seeks new curbs to cap
bank bonuses
13/04/2012 12/04/2012 no FT
EU to push for binding investor vote on pay 16/05/2012 16/05/2012 no FT
Europe’s banks face tougher demands 16/07/2012 11/07/2012 no FT
Massive softening’ of Basel bank rules 07/01/2013 07/01/2013 yes FT
Basel watchdog to close loophole over use of pricey
credit protection
25/03/2013 22/03/2013 no FT
Banks win Basel leverage concessions 13/01/2014 13/01/2014 yes FT
1B. Events associated with AIFMD
Private equity leaders condemn draft EU law 20/04/2009 20/04/2009 no FT
EU 2, Locusts 0 06/05/2009 06/05/2009 no FT
Hope for alternatives redraft 10/08/2009 10/08/2009 yes FT
ECB warns Brussels over hedge fund regulation;
ECB sees danger in Europe’s hedge fund plan
23/10/2009 23/10/2009 yes FT
Veto EU hedge fund curbs, say peers 10/02/2010 10/02/2010 yes FT
EU rebuff for Geithner over rules on hedge funds 12/03/2010 12/03/2010 yes FT
EU plans hurdles for hedge funds 10/05/2010 10/05/2010 no FT
AIFMD rules to be diluted 12/07/2010 12/07/2010 yes FT
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property companies across France, Germany and the U.K., we group the
companies into 11 subsamples. Each subsample is based on a selection of
approximately the top 15 companies with the highest value in a given category
and approximately the top 15 companies with the lowest value in this category.
The categories are total assets, debt-to-equity (DE) ratio, and loan-to-value
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Fig. 4 Weighted average of daily stock returns of the baseline sample of real estate companies. Note: The
figure shows equally-weighted returns of the real estate companies in the category largest REITs which are
listed in Table 5
Table 1 (continued)
Article title Publication
date
Event date Loosening
regulation
news
Source
Funds and buy-outs braced for rise in regulation 17/11/2011 10/11/2011 no FT
Brussels revives funds’ fears over rules 02/04/2012 02/04/2012 no FT
BaFin Consultation 03/2013 – Scope Of The
KAGB-E/Interpretation Of The Term BInvestment
Fund^
03/04/2013 28/03/2013 no Bafin
Consulta-
tion
German regulator in property U-turn 01/07/2013 01/07/2013 yes FT
1C. Events associated with EMIR
Commission proposal for a regulation on OTC
derivatives, central Counterparties and trade
repositories
15/09/2010 15/09/2010 no EC
Geithner urges EU to fall in line with derivatives
rules
09/06/2011 09/06/2011 no FT
Dodd-Frank delays offer OTC reprieve 06/07/2011 15/06/2011 yes FT
Fears on OTC derivatives plan 15/07/2011 15/07/2011 no FT
Clearing house push set for delay 25/01/2013 25/01/2013 yes FT
Deadline set for derivatives dealers 08/11/2013 08/11/2013 no FT
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(LTV) ratio. The balance-sheet company data that serves to split the firms into
the categories comes from SNL Financial. In addition, we form country-level4
subsamples of the REITs with the highest total assets. For Germany, we have a
subsample of the 15 German real estate operating companies (REOCs) with the
highest total assets. We include REOCs rather than only REITs as most of the
active real estate companies in Germany do not have a REIT status and those
companies which are REITs do not date back very far, so the time series
information is not enough for our estimation. Therefore, we also account for
differences between REITs and REOCs by splitting the companies into a large
REITs and a large non-REITs sample incusing the companies of all three
countries. When selecting the companies, we make sure that we exclude firms
which show abnormal return patters and outliers which may be due to changes
in the status of the company, a merger, equity issuance, etc. The 92 companies
are distributed in 11 subsamples with some of the companies featuring in
several subsamples. Almost half (41) of the companies feature in only one
subsample. Thirty companies feature in two subsamples and another 20 in three
subsamples. Only one company features in four subsamples. Overall, there are
11 samples of 15 companies, so 165 ‘slots’ to fill in the subsamples. With 92
companies split into these 11 samples, this means that typical firm appears in
1.8 samples.
In Table 2, we can see that the companies with the lowest total assets have an
average balance sheet size of 38 million euros as opposed to almost 12,000
million euros for the companies in the highest-assets grouping. The smallest
4 This is based on the origin of the company and its headquarters and not on the location of the assets of the
company. Some companies may invest internationally as well but as real estate is a highly information
intensive asset, managers would prefer to be close to their assets, hence invest in local markets.
Table 2 Summary statistics of different types of company groupings
Types of groupings Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Lowest total assets (thousand EUR) 38,196 28,056 241 89,763
Highest total assets (thousand EUR) 11,716,398 7,400,860 4813,600 35,570,200
Largest REITs (thousand EUR) 9,954,926 8,156,053 2,657,391 35,570,200
Largest non-REITs (thousand EUR) 5,195,863 3,703,032 1,971,351 14,759,200
UK largest REITs (thousand EUR) 4191,121 3,926,589 923,900 12,171,700
French largest REITs (thousand EUR) 7137,124 9,287,028 810,400 35,570,200
German largest REOCs (thousand EUR) 3,486,302 4,251,709 402,196 14,759,200
Lowest DE ratio (%) 5 7 0 18
Highest DE ratio (%) 336 92 216 541
Lowest LTV (%) 18 6 7 26
Highest LTV (%) 65 13 54 94
The names of the companies entering in each category are listed in Table 5 in the Appendix. DE stands for
debt-to-equity, LTV stands for loan-to-value, REOCs stands for real estate operating companies, REITs stands
for real estate investment trusts. In each grouping there are 15 companies with the highest or lowest values in
the respective category across France, Germany and the U.K. for 2015
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company is Black Sea Property Fund Limited from the U.K. with a balance
sheet size of 0.241 million euros. The smallest real estate company in the
highest-assets category is Segro Plc from the U.K. with a size of 4813 million
euros. The largest company in this category is Unibail-Rodamco SE with a size
of 35,570 million euros. Within the large-size subsample, we also split the
funds into largest REITs and largest non-REITs. Among the 15 largest REITs,
there are no German firms and the split is almost equal between U.K. and
French companies. Among the largest non-REITs there are mainly German and
U.K. firms with the largest company for which data is available being Deutsche
Wohnen SE from Germany. The average size among the largest non-REITs is
5196 million euros as compared to 9955 million euros for REITs. When we
look at country level data, we see that French companies have the largest size
with 7137 million euros on average, followed by U.K. companies with 4191
million euros and German firms with 3586 million euros.
In terms of the DE ratio, the average ratio in the low category is 5% with the
majority of the companies reporting no debt. The average DE ratio in the high
category is nearly 800%. A similar proportion of German and U.K. funds are
among those which report the highest DE ratios. U.K. funds are however also
among those with the lowest DE ratios. The average reported LTV ratio for the
low category is 18% with companies reporting ratios between 7% and 26%. All
of the companies in this category are based in the U.K. The average LTV ratio
in the high category is 65% with a maximum ratio of 94% for Alpha Pyrenees
Trust Limited which also has the highest DE ratio, and a minimum ratio of
54%. Similar to the DE ratio, most companies are either from the U.K. or
Germany. French companies seem not to be in the two extremes for most of the
criteria.
Estimation Procedure
One way to account for the impact of regulatory announcements is to use an event study
(Schwert 1981; Binder 1985; Brown and Warner 1985; Lamdin 2001). We measure the
effect of a regulatory event on the day of its announcement by calculating the abnormal
returns for each company. In order to capture the effect of regulation we augment the market
model by event dummy variables (Binder 1985; Schäfer et al. 2015). This approach differs
from the standard way event studies are conducted. The majority of research using event
studies accounts for abnormal returns by looking at the residuals applying a two-stage OLS
regression. The reason for using the dummy variable approach rather than the classical two-
stage estimation is that our events are associated with regulations simultaneously affecting
all companies rather than with company-specific events. Schipper and Thompson (1983)
and Campbell et al. (1996) argue that the dummy-variable approach increases the efficiency
of the estimation accounting for (1) multiple announcement events for a given regulatory
change, (2) high cross-sectional correlation in the residuals, and (3) small sample size. The
correlation across the residuals can be due to the fact that the announcement of news occurs
on the same date for all companies, as is the case for international regulations and to
common industry factors across the companies. The model consists of stock returns
regressed on a constant, the return of the market index and event dummy variables for the
respective regulation:
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R1t ¼ α1 þ β1RMt þ ∑
Tþ1
n¼T−1
τ1nD1nt þ ε1t
…
Rit ¼ αi þ βiRMt þ ∑
Tþ1
n¼T−1
τ inDint þ εit
…
RIt ¼ αI þ βIRMt þ ∑
Tþ1
n¼T−1
τ InDInt þ εIt
ð1Þ
with i the return in day t with i = 1, ..., I and t = 1, ..., T + 1, where T is the day of the
regulatory announcement. RMt is the global market return which is the same for each
company. However, the estimation coefficients – alpha and beta, as well as those for the
dummy variables – differ across the companies. Dint denotes a vector of dummy variables
for all sub-events in the estimation window associated with one regulation. Normally each
equation will contain only one sub-event. However, if during the estimation window there
have been previous news associated with the regulation, we follow Schäfer et al. (2015) and
include those event dummies as well as ameans of ‘dummying out’ the ‘old’ news. The idea
is that the estimated returns account for previous adjustment to past events and the impact of
the news is correctly estimated. For each sub-event there are three dummies. A pre-event
dummy that takes the value 1 one day before the event (T–1) and zero otherwise. It is
included in order to account for investors anticipating the regulatory news. An event dummy
that takes the value 1 on the day of the event (T) and the value of zero otherwise; and a post-
event dummy which is equal to 1 one day after the event (T + 1) and zero otherwise. The
latter is included in order to account for investorswho react to regulatory newswith some lag
due e.g. to differences in trading times. The dummy coefficient τin measures the abnormal
return for a company i for a given day t in the event window. The estimation window begins
80 trading days before the sub-event and ends 1 day after it. For robustness purposes, we
estimate the models using an estimation window of 40 days and 120 days as well.
We estimate model (1) as a system of equations using a seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) (Zellner 1962; Binder 1985). The alternative would be to use a
two-stage least square regression as in Campbell et al. (1996) but the SUR is shown
to be more appropriate to estimate the standard errors as it accounts for regulatory
events which have a simultaneous effect on a large sample of companies at the same
time. For each sub-event a separate system is estimated which leaves us in the case of
Basel III with 18 systems for the 18 sub-events.
Moreover, in order to measure the impact of regulatory news on changes of the
sensitivity (beta) of each firm to the benchmark, we expand the model in (1) to directly
account for regulatory effects on the beta coefficients during the event:
R1t ¼ α1 þ β1RMt þ ∑
Tþ1
n¼T−1
τ1nD1nt þ δ1D1EtRMt þ ε1t
…
Rit ¼ αi þ βiRMt þ ∑
Tþ1
n¼T−1
τ inDint þ δiDiEtRMt þ εit
…
RIt ¼ αI þ βIRMt þ ∑
Tþ1
n¼T−1
τ InDInt þ δIDIEtRMt þ εIt
ð2Þ
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with DiEt an interaction dummy variable which is set equal to one during the
event. The parameter δi accounts for the instantaneous change in the asset’s
sensitivity to the market which occurs on the day of the announcement. As
discussed by Lamdin (2001), δi is an estimate of the transitional response of
beta as it captures the change in beta only during the event but not before or
after the regulatory announcement. Therefore, model (2) simultaneously tests
for the required return effect (βi) and the revaluation effect (δi).
Timeline for Basel III News
Figure 5 shows the relationship between the market return and the return of the
companies from the baseline sample which includes the large REITs from the U.K.,
Germany and France for each of the Basel III news dates. The black line represents the
STOXX return. We can see that the market not always responds to news associated
with Basel III as for some news it is close to the zero line. In particular for news
towards the end of the event window we see little effect on the market as a whole. We
also observe that news towards the beginning of the announcement timeline have rather
negative impacts whereas news afterwards have more scattered impacts – changing
from positive to negative and vice versa. The first news that we identify is on April 2,
2009 and is related to the G20 summit during which the official announcement of Basel
III legislation was made. That is followed by a large period of no relevant news and the
first new announcement is associated with another G20 meeting on June 26–27, 2010
which is announcing some relaxation on the initial stance regarding the banking
regulation. News thereafter appear quite frequently (one every 1 or 2 months) and
some of them are related to press releases by institutions such as the Financial Stability
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Fig. 5 Timeline of Basel III news and stock market returns. Note: The figure shows the daily returns in the
category largest REITs which are listed in Table 5 (bars) along with the market return based on the STOXX
European Index (line)
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Board (FSB), the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) or the European Banking
Authority (EBA). Some of the news are not associated with official regulatory docu-
ments but rather the expression of opinions of involved parties through interviews.
When we collect those dates, we double check in Bloomberg and Google that the
article we are using to identify the date of the news is the first one to appear and there
are no other releases in other media prior to that. This is done on a case-by-case basis
since the small number of events allows us to do so.
REIT returns respond to the news along the timeline differently. Some news (the first
announcement on February 2, 2009, May 27, 2011, October 18, 2010) have strong
uniform effects across all REITs, other announcements have opposite effects with some
returns increasing, others falling (September 15, 2009, October 10, 2011, April 3, 2012,
May 16, 2012). The strongest overall price changes have been observed in the very
beginning of the Basel III consultations. In the last stages of the event window, the
effects diminish. These findings suggest that market participants may get used to more
news being announced as the regulation consultations progress and hence may dampen
their response. In almost all cases though, the REIT price changes are larger than those
of the market index meaning that REITs are proportionally more strongly affected that
the average across all types of companies.
Results
We obtain results for 11 different subsamples – large REITs versus large non-REITs,
smallest versus largest REOCs, REOCs with lowest versus highest LTV ratios, REOCs
with lowest versus highest DE ratios, REOCs in the U.K., REOCs in France, and REOCs in
Germany. The results distinguish across the three regulations – Basel III, AIFMD and
EMIR. News about tighter and more restrictive regulation are classified as ‘restrictive
regulation’ news from the point of view of the regulated institution. Announcements which
are associated with amendments which relax the regulation for the affected parties are
classified as ‘loosening regulation’ news. Below, we look at the effect of restrictive
regulation news and loosening regulation news both together and separately. We would
focus on restrictive regulation news as those are the news concerning the affected parties.
Moreover, there is a large number of studies showing that markets respond asymmetrically
to positive and negative shocks with the response to negative shocks significantly stronger
than to positive shocks (Chen et al. 2005; Smales 2015; Williams 2015).
We differentiate between companies responding negatively to news about regulatory
tightening (in line with the regulatory burden hypothesis), companies responding posi-
tively (in line with the profit-based reaction hypothesis), and companies with no signif-
icant response (in line with the irrelevance hypothesis). We summarize the results in
Tables 3 and 4. In theAppendix we report detailed results including the average abnormal
returns (AARs) for each announcement, each subsample and each regulation along with
p-values of an F-test for the joint significance of the returns for each announcement.
Basel III
On average, we observe significant AARs following regulatory news about Basel III in
less than 50% of cases (see Table 3). We use the sample consisting of large REITs for
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Table 4 How companies are reacting to tighter regulation news – proportion of significant responses (AARs)
Significant negative
response to tighter
regulation news
Significant positive
response to tighter
regulation news
Total significant
response to tighter
regulation news
Basel III (out of 12
negative news)
Baseline 33.33% 25.00% 58.33%
Small 41.67% 16.67% 58.33%
Large 0.00% 41.67% 41.67%
Low LTV 8.33% 33.33% 41.67%
High LTV 25.00% 33.33% 58.33%
Low DE 50.00% 16.67% 66.67%
High DE 25.00% 25.00% 50.00%
Beta baseline 8.33% 16.67% 25.00%
AIFMD (out of 6
negative news)
Baseline 33.33% 50.00% 83.33%
UK 0.00% 33.33% 33.33%
France 33.33% 66.67% 100.00%
Germany 0.00% 66.67% 66.67%
Small 16.67% 16.67% 33.33%
Large 16.67% 66.67% 83.33%
Beta baseline 16.67% 50.00% 66.67%
EMIR (out of 4
negative news)
Baseline 0.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Beta baseline 0.00% 25.00% 25.00%
Small 25.00% 0.00% 25.00%
Large 50.00% 0.00% 50.00%
The percentages are calculated as the proportion between the number of significant positive (negative) average
abnormal returns (AARs) for each subsample and the total number of tighter regulation news events for each
type of regulation
Table 3 Percentage of significant AARs to any news about financial market regulation
Basel III (out of 18 news events) AIFMD (out of 12 news events) EMIR (out of 6 news events)
Baseline 44.44% 66.67% 33.33%
Beta 27.78% 58.33% 33.33%
Small 50.00% 25.00% 50.00%
Large 33.33% 58.33% 50.00%
Low LTV 38.89%
High LTV 55.56%
Low DE 50.00%
High DE 44.44%
UK 33.33%
France 75.00%
Germany 33.33%
The average abnormal return (AAR) is the average return across 15 company returns for each category
(subsample). The percentages are calculated as the share of the number of significant responses (AARs) to
each type of regulation to the total number of news events for each type of regulation
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the baseline estimation. In eight out of the 18 Basel III news, we observe significant
AARs which vary between as low as −5.3% and as high as 1.6% (see Table 6). These
figures show a stronger shift to the left side of the distribution as compared with Schäfer
et al. (2015) who report AARs between −2.2% and 2.7% following Dodd-Frank Act
announcements. This suggests that REITs seem to be strongly negatively affected by
banking regulation news suggesting that markets can fear the negative effects from the
bank lending channel. This means that any news about Basel III in that early stage in
2010–2012 spread fears among REIT investors about potential borrowing constraints
from banks.
Comparing the results across the different subsamples, we find that there are only
small differences across them. The most significant AARs are observed for companies
with high LTV ratios (Table 7). In 55% of the news events regarding Basel III, AARs of
companies with high LTVs are significant. Small companies and companies with low
DE ratios also show significant responses in 50% of the cases. Those results however
are based on all news and hence it is hard to say anything about the underlying drivers
of the significance. Therefore, in what comes next, we examine in more detail how
tighter regulation news, in particular, affect the subsamples and analyze the extent of
the asymmetric reaction.
Overall, we observe asymmetric effects to news with tighter regulation news causing
a stronger return reaction than loosening regulation news. This is in line with previous
studies (Williams 2015) which show that the response to negative shocks is stronger
than to positive shocks. Companies with low DE ratios and small companies are among
those most negatively affected by the regulatory news (see Table 4). This is in line with
the regulatory burden hypothesis (see Figs. 1 and 2) postulating that financial market
regulation may increase the costs for financial institutions and pass them through to
borrowers. Even though Basel III does not regulate real estate companies directly, the
banking regulation can affect property company returns through the bank lending
channel as described above. Basel III tightens the capital requirements for specific
types of real estate loans such as some development loans and project loans. As a result,
banks may decide to reduce their credit provision or increase the credit costs for those
borrowers. Therefore, companies which more heavily rely on bank borrowing would be
more strongly affected by Basel III announcements as shown in our results.
Table 4 shows that the most indebted companies in terms of LTV ratios respond
more frequently to tightening Basel III news than companies which have among the
lowest LTV ratios. However, the economic significance is small, as only in 25% of the
events we see a significant decrease in the AARs. This is less than the 33% for which
we observe significant positive AARs. Therefore, we do not find strong evidence that
more indebted companies per se respond more strongly to negative Basel III news. This
is also the case when we sort by DE ratio. We observe that companies with high DE
ratios respond significantly only in 25% of the events. In another 25% of cases the
effect is significantly positive. This supports the irrelevance hypothesis associated with
regulatory arbitrage. Companies with a high proportion of debt relative to their equity
may have diversified their funding sources and do not heavily rely on bank borrowing.
That would enable them to tap into other sources of funding from less regulated
financial institutions or issue their own debt. This is supported by the fact that
companies with low DE ratios respond to tightening Basel III news negatively in
50% of the events as opposed to only 17% for which the response is positive. This
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highlights that companies with low DE ratios may more heavily rely on bank funding
even though their debt proportion is low. Small companies with limited access to
alternative financing are the ones most negatively affected by tightening in banking
regulation as they report the highest share of significant negative AARs. So, for small
firms we find evidence for the regulatory burden hypothesis in line with previous
studies (Dean and Brown 1995; Beck et al. 2005; Rice and Strahan 2010). That shows
that tight regulations have the most negative impact on small companies as such firms
may not be able to cover the increase in compliance and other costs associated with the
reforms. This may lead to consolidation on the market for real estate companies. Our
results are similar to Beck et al. (2005) who find that the smallest firms are most
adversely affected by regulatory barriers. Schäfer et al. (2015) also conclude that
regulatory announcements have different effects on small versus large banks. They
find that large systemically important banks show higher responses to regulatory
announcements as they are subject to tighter regulations than small banks.
In terms of changes in the beta coefficient, we can see that Basel III does not lead to
changes in the systematic risk of the companies as measured by the abnormal beta on
the day of the event (see Table 10). It seems that the overall exposure to the market is
not affected following that regulation.
AIFMD
Real estate firms respond more frequently to news about AIFMD than about Basel
III. In the baseline case, in 67% of the news events regarding AIFMD we find a
significant response (see Table 3). The strong effects of AIFMD news can be due
to the fact that this regulation targets non-UCITS funds which have previously
been much less regulated and hence the news would not have been anticipated. The
AAR varies between −5.5% and 1% (see Table 6). We have an equal split between
tightening and loosening news with the former having by far a stronger effect on
returns than the latter. Similar as above, this provides evidence for asymmetric
responses to news. This is in line with previous research showing asymmetrical
responses to shocks on the housing and stock markets (Copper et al. 2000;
McDonald et al. 2000; Tsai et al. 2012; Hoesli and Reka 2013). However, we find
that market participants are not always responding negatively to tighter regulation
news. In 50% of the events, in fact, they are responding positively to regulatory
tightening as opposed to 33% of a positive responses. This is in line with the
profit-based reaction hypothesis that regulation is not perceived as a burden but
rather seen as a means to increased efficiency and lower systemic risks. The initial
draft of the AIFMD does not specify whether REITs fall within the regulation but
if they are regarded as alternative funds, then they would be regulated. At a later
stage, the confusion has been resolved with most of the REITs falling outside of
the regulation. However, at the time of the news announcements this was not
known and hence we observe significant abnormal returns. As it was not clear if
AIFMD would affect real estate companies, real estate firms may have seen it as an
arbitrage opportunity in which if they were not regulated while other similar
entities are, the regulation would prove arbitrage opportunities.
We find that the positive regulatory effect is particularly strong for large real estate
firms with 67% of the AARs responding significantly positive. This can mean that large
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firms can extract most value from the regulatory arbitrage opportunity due to econo-
mies of scale. Small companies seem not to be strongly affected by the news.
We also look at how regulation has impacted companies from different European
countries looking at large real estate firms from France, Germany and the U.K. (see
Table 9). The reason is that it is down to the country to decide the way in which
companies should comply with the AIFMD. We find that French companies are by far
most affected byAIFMDwith significant responses to negative news in each news event.
German real estate companies respond in 67% of the cases. However, we observe that the
effects on AARs are positive in most of those cases. This can be related to size issues as
described above (French companies are the largest in our sample). We do not find strong
effects of AIFMD in the U.K. This may be due to the structure of the British real estate
firms which are rather structured as operating companies rather than as funds.
In terms of the systematic risk of real estate firms, we can see that the AIFMD
regulation leads to significant changes in the beta coefficient on the day of the
announcement (see Table 10) in 58% of the cases. In most of the cases, the effect on
the performance is negative, with beta increasing significantly. When there is negative
news related to AIFMD, i.e. announcing tighter regulation, we observe an increase in
the beta coefficient. Beta increases by 0.001 on average following the news. This
means that real estate companies would be more exposed to market variations follow-
ing the regulatory announcements which can be due to the uncertainty surrounding the
regulation, i.e. how real estate companies are treated and if they fall within the
regulation. Sing et al. (2016) show that the high beta of some REITs can be explained
by a leverage factor suggesting that more indebted REITs would have a high beta.
EMIR
EMIR is a much smaller regulation as compared to Basel III. However, it can affect all
financial institutions which trade derivatives. For this reason, we also assess the impact
of it and compare it to the effects of large-scale regulations. The baseline results in
Table 3 show that EMIR has overall small impact on real estate company returns. The
AAR varies between −1% and 0.4% across the news (see Table 6). This effect is much
smaller than the effects observed for the above two regulations which is understandable
given the small scope of this regulation.
Furthermore, we do not find that there are large differences between large and small
companies (see Table 3). However, looking only at the tighter regulatory news asso-
ciated with EMIR, we can see that large companies are more strongly negatively
affected than small ones (see Table 8). This makes sense since most of the large
companies actively hedge interest rate and exchange rate risks using derivatives such
as swaps. Hence we can interpret this finding as showing evidence for prevailing
negative effects of EMIR for large companies due to the collateral costs of hedging.
Robustness Tests
Table 11 shows results for estimations using an alternative market index – the MSCI
global – and alternative estimation windows – 40 days and 120 days. Overall, the results
are robust when using the alternative market index across the different specifications.
With regards to the estimation windows, we observe that there are more significant
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announcements for the 40-day rolling window than for the 80-day window. When the
sample is estimated using 120 days, there are even fewer significant responses. We also
perform a placebo test in which we use random dates of events for each of the
regulations and find out that there are fewer significant responses which highlights that
our event identification strategy has been successful at recognizing news.
Concluding Remarks
This study assesses the impacts of announcements about international financial
market regulatory reforms following the GFC on the equity performance of listed
real estate companies. We look at the impacts of three international regulations
undertaken in the aftermath of the GFC – Basel III, AIFMD and EMIR – on the
returns of European real estate companies. The regulations have different scopes
and regulate distinct financial institutions. While Basel III is a large-scale banking
regulation widely discussed in the media, EMIR has much smaller media cover-
age. However, Basel III regulates only banks while EMIR can affect all financial
institutions which trade derivative products.
The challenge to assess the impact of the regulations lies in identifying the event
dates associated with regulatory announcements. The reason is that large-scale re-
forms are phased out over many years and their final enactment may already have
been anticipated by market participants. Therefore, we employ an event study meth-
odology using daily financial market data. The regulatory event dates are manually
identified using articles in international financial newspapers and news agencies. As
we look at regulatory reforms enacted at the European level, we compare the effects
across several European countries (the U.K., Germany, and France) with the largest
listed real estate sectors.
Our results show large differences across the three regulations. Basel III and
EMIR have overall small aggregate effects on the performance as they do not
directly regulate real estate companies. However we find some support for the
regulatory burden hypothesis of the bank lending channel. We document that the
banking regulation negatively affects small firms and firms with low debt-to-
equity ratios. This may suggest that the strongest effect is observed for firms who
cannot diversify their funding sources and are thus hit strongest by Basel III. The
direct regulatory channel through the AIFMD supports rather the profit-based
reaction hypothesis. Mainly large firms are affected positively by the regulation
which can be due to identified regulatory arbitrage opportunities for real estate
companies if they do not have to comply with AIFMD. Overall, we see that
different regulation can have opposite effects on companies and it is important to
look at them separately as well as assess the impacts of tighter regulation and
loosening regulation news separately. We find strong evidence for asymmetric
effects with tighter regulation news more frequently leading to significant
responses.
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Table 6 Average abnormal returns for large European real estate companies associated with news about Basel
III, AIFMD and EMIR
A. Basel III
Event Date Positive news Large non-REITs Large REITs
AAR p-value AAR p-value
02/04/2009 no 0.0321 * 0.0934 -0.0057 *** 0.0001
25/06/2010 yes -0.0130 0.2149 0.0033 0.8975
13/09/2010 no 0.0183 0.8051 0.0128 * 0.0843
20/10/2010 yes 0.0046 *** 0.0002 -0.0055 0.1017
12/11/2010 no 0.0368 0.7347 -0.0005 0.8110
16/12/2010 no -0.0023 0.6576 -0.0069 0.2467
27/05/2011 yes 0.0216 0.9910 -0.0001 0.4271
19/07/2011 no 0.0340 *** 0.0001 0.0008 *** 0.0001
10/10/2011 no -0.0018 0.7653 0.0105 0.6662
18/10/2011 no -0.0147 0.8281 -0.0018 ** 0.0282
09/01/2012 no -0.0130 *** 0.0046 0.0161 *** 0.0000
03/04/2012 yes 0.0031 0.6065 0.0078 0.5381
12/04/2012 no 0.0172 0.9869 0.0013 0.2474
16/05/2012 no 0.0146 *** 0.0000 -0.0528 *** 0.0000
11/07/2012 no -0.0110 0.9993 0.0022 0.6311
07/01/2013 yes 0.0035 *** 0.0030 -0.0004 *** 0.0046
22/03/2013 no 0.0022 *** 0.0089 -0.0029 *** 0.0000
13/01/2014 yes 0.0086 * 0.0656 0.0022 0.4255
B. AIFMD
Event date Positive news Large non-REITs Large REITs
AAR p-value AAR p-value
20/04/2009 no -0.0230 0.1891 0.0064 ** 0.0253
06/05/2009 no 0.0083 *** 0.0000 0.0112 *** 0.0022
10/08/2009 yes 0.0159 0.3303 0.0014 ** 0.0159
23/10/2009 yes -0.0153 0.4447 0.0004 0.9913
10/02/2010 yes 0.0083 0.9447 -0.0004 *** 0.0000
12/03/2010 yes 0.0063 0.9980 0.0004 1.0000
10/05/2010 no 0.0451 *** 0.0000 0.0079 *** 0.0000
12/07/2010 yes -0.0045 0.6732 -0.0105 0.8312
10/11/2011 no 0.0029 0.6747 -0.0551 ** 0.0107
02/04/2012 no -0.0020 0.9137 0.0043 0.9831
28/03/2013 no 0.0080 0.4320 -0.0029 *** 0.0000
01/07/2013 yes 0.0200 0.2771 -0.0094 * 0.0520
Is Financial Regulation Good or Bad for Real Estate Companies? – An...
Table 6 (continued)
C. EMIR
Event date Positive news Large non-REITs Large REITs
AAR p-value AAR p-value
15/09/2010 no -0.0060 0.4217 0.0042 *** 0.0023
09/06/2011 no 0.0064 0.9317 -0.0003 0.9992
15/06/2011 yes -0.0204 0.9472 -0.0012 0.9996
15/07/2011 no -0.0196 *** 0.0020 0.0019 ** 0.0240
25/01/2013 yes 0.0137 * 0.0653 -0.0012 * 0.0694
08/11/2013 no -0.0023 0.2598 -0.0103 0.2291
The table shows the average abnormal return (AAR) for the baseline sample. The results are based on SUR
regressions using an estimation window of 80 trading days. AARs are estimated on the basis of the Stoxx Total
Market Return Index. The dependent variable is daily stock returns of real estate companies. All regressions
include pre-event and post-event dummies in order to account for anticipation effects. Moreover, other news
associated with the regulation in case they fall within the estimation window are dummied out
M. Hoesli et al.
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Table 8 Comparison of average abnormal returns for small versus large real estate operating companies
(REOCs)
Event date Positive news Small REOCs Large REOCs
AAR p-value AAR p-value
A. Basel III
02/04/2009 no -0.0010 *** 0.0000 0.0321 *** 0.0000
25/06/2010 yes 0.0053 0.9979 -0.0130 0.8204
13/09/2010 no 0.0025 0.4315 0.0183 0.3131
20/10/2010 yes 0.0018 0.9897 0.0046 *** 0.0012
12/11/2010 no 0.0033 0.5618 0.0368 0.3671
16/12/2010 no 0.0089 *** 0.0000 -0.0023 0.3620
27/05/2011 yes -0.0051 0.6526 0.0216 0.4209
19/07/2011 no -0.0023 *** 0.0010 0.0340 *** 0.0030
10/10/2011 no -0.0111 *** 0.0046 -0.0018 0.3254
18/10/2011 no -0.0442 0.2141 -0.0147 0.1918
09/01/2012 no -0.1750 *** 0.0000 -0.0130 0.2711
03/04/2012 yes -0.0018 *** 0.0000 0.0031 0.3441
12/04/2012 no -0.0025 0.9978 0.0172 * 0.0574
16/05/2012 no -0.0010 ** 0.0446 0.0146 *** 0.0000
11/07/2012 no 0.0057 *** 0.0000 -0.0110 0.7675
07/01/2013 yes -0.0004 *** 0.0000 0.0035 0.1149
22/03/2013 no 0.0028 0.9396 0.0022 ** 0.0125
13/01/2014 yes 0.0054 0.9884 0.0086 0.7145
B. AIFMD
20/04/2009 no -0.0108 0.8592 -0.0230 *** 0.0014
06/05/2009 no -0.0011 0.9751 0.0083 * 0.0870
10/08/2009 yes -0.0063 0.6069 0.0159 0.9742
23/10/2009 yes -0.0156 0.9998 -0.0153 0.9522
10/02/2010 yes 0.0014 0.3221 0.0083 *** 0.0000
12/03/2010 yes 0.0029 1.0000 0.0063 0.9998
10/05/2010 no -0.0018 *** 0.0000 0.0451 *** 0.0000
12/07/2010 yes -0.0483 0.8182 -0.0045 0.8650
10/11/2011 no -0.0065 0.9999 0.0029 ** 0.0318
02/04/2012 no 0.0041 *** 0.0000 -0.0020 0.9214
28/03/2013 no 0.0017 1.0000 0.0080 *** 0.0001
01/07/2013 yes -0.0005 *** 0.0004 0.0200 ** 0.0168
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Table 9 Comparison of average abnormal returns for U.K., French and German real estate companies
following AIFMD news
Event date Positive news UK France Germany
AAR p-value AAR p-value AAR p-value
20/04/2009 no −0.0642 0.8509 0.0064 *** 0.0000 0.0161 0.3064
06/05/2009 no 0.0486 * 0.0946 0.0112 *** 0.0015 0.1345 *** 0.0000
10/08/2009 yes 0.0151 0.2992 0.0014 *** 0.0000 0.1389 0.1103
23/10/2009 yes −0.0198 0.8666 0.0004 1.0000 0.0024 0.1309
10/02/2010 yes 0.0032 0.4250 −0.0004 *** 0.0000 0.0501 0.9734
12/03/2010 yes 0.0151 * 0.0684 0.0004 1.0000 0.0093 0.9790
10/05/2010 no 0.0427 *** 0.0000 0.0079 *** 0.0000 0.0517 *** 0.0000
12/07/2010 yes 0.0051 0.2102 −0.0105 0.8098 0.0122 0.9882
10/11/2011 no −0.0131 0.7159 −0.0551 ** 0.0098 0.0055 * 0.0556
02/04/2012 no −0.0007 0.5126 0.0043 *** 0.0013 0.0038 * 0.0913
28/03/2013 no 0.0072 0.7385 −0.0029 *** 0.0000 −0.0030 0.6238
01/07/2013 yes 0.0097 *** 0.0002 −0.0094 *** 0.0052 −0.0163 0.5275
The table shows the average abnormal return (AAR) for property companies from the U.K., France and
Germany. AAR refers to the average abnormal return of the real estate operating companies in each country for
each subevent. The results are based on SUR regressions using an estimation window of 80 trading days.
AARs are estimated on the basis of the Stoxx Total Market Return Index. The dependent variable is daily
stock returns of real estate companies. All regressions include pre-event and post-event dummies in order to
account for anticipation effects. Moreover, other news associated with the regulation in case they fall within
the estimation window are dummied out
Table 8 (continued)
Event date Positive news Small REOCs Large REOCs
AAR p-value AAR p-value
C. EMIR
15/09/2010 no 0.0121 0.3005 -0.0060 ** 0.0474
09/06/2011 no 0.0016 0.5784 0.0064 0.9994
15/06/2011 yes 0.0065 ** 0.0207 -0.0204 0.9507
15/07/2011 no -0.0042 *** 0.0000 -0.0196 ** 0.0390
25/01/2013 yes -0.0061 *** 0.0000 0.0137 ** 0.0100
08/11/2013 no -0.0011 0.9990 -0.0023 0.1527
AAR refers to the average abnormal return of the real estate operating companies for each subevent. The
results are based on SUR regressions using an estimation window of 80 trading days. Stock returns are
estimated on the basis of the Stoxx Total Market Return Index. The dependent variable is daily stock returns of
real estate companies. All regressions include pre-event and post-event dummies in order to account for
anticipation effects. Moreover, other news associated with the regulation in case they fall within the estimation
window are dummied out
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Table 10 Changes in beta for large REITs due to regulatory news about Basel III, AIFMD and EMIR
Event date Loosening
regulation news
Transitional beta p-value
A. Basel III
02/04/2009 no -0.00009 0.1813
25/06/2010 yes 0.00004 0.5708
13/09/2010 no 0.00014 0.8438
20/10/2010 yes -0.00006 0.0296
12/11/2010 no 0.00000 0.5851
16/12/2010 no -0.00007 0.7456
27/05/2011 yes 0.00000 * 0.0990
19/07/2011 no 0.00001 * 0.0761
10/10/2011 no 0.00012 0.3944
18/10/2011 no -0.00002 0.3322
09/01/2012 no 0.00016 ** 0.0316
03/04/2012 yes 0.00008 0.9824
12/04/2012 no 0.00001 0.5660
16/05/2012 no -0.00053 *** 0.0000
11/07/2012 no 0.00002 0.6309
07/01/2013 yes 0.00000 *** 0.0022
22/03/2013 no -0.00002 0.7156
13/01/2014 yes 0.00002 0.4717
B. AIFMD
20/04/2009 no 0.00010 *** 0.0036
06/05/2009 no 0.00016 ** 0.0370
10/08/2009 yes 0.00002 *** 0.0060
23/10/2009 yes 0.00000 0.9764
10/02/2010 yes 0.00000 *** 0.0002
12/03/2010 yes 0.00000 0.8942
10/05/2010 no 0.00008 *** 0.0000
12/07/2010 yes -0.00012 0.6564
10/11/2011 no -0.00060 0.1133
02/04/2012 no 0.00004 0.8058
28/03/2013 no -0.00002 *** 0.0000
01/07/2013 yes -0.00008 * 0.0798
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Table 10 (continued)
Event date Loosening
regulation news
Transitional beta p-value
C. EMIR
15/09/2010 no 0.00005 0.1191
09/06/2011 no 0.00000 0.8990
15/06/2011 yes -0.00001 0.9942
15/07/2011 no 0.00002 0.9833
25/01/2013 yes -0.00001 * 0.0911
08/11/2013 no -0.00008 * 0.0740
The table shows the average transitional beta value for the day of the news announcement for the baseline
sample. The results are based on SUR regressions using an estimation window of 80 trading days. Stock
returns are estimated on the basis of the Stoxx Total Market Return Index. The dependent variable is daily
stock returns of real estate companies. All regressions include pre-event and post-event dummies in order to
account for anticipation effects. Moreover, other news associated with the regulation in case they fall within
the estimation window are dummied out
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